to focus on the role of fragmentation in the outbreak of civil war, which cannot be studied with a focus on rebels alone. Likewise, examining fragmentation of opposition movements, rather than the fragmentation in the state as a whole (such as the number, or potential number of opposition movements in the state), allows for examining how the characteristics of actors affect the propensity for civil war. This paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain the outbreak of conflict as bargaining failure and elaborate how internal divisions in opposition movements affect the credibility of opposition factions and the level of uncertainty about what kind of settlement can resolve their dispute with the state. The central hypothesis is that more fragmented opposition movements will be more likely to engage in civil war. Following that, I provide empirical tests of this expectation on a set of disputes over self-determination, using detailed data on the structure of self-determination movements over time. The data on the internal structure of SD movements, including how many factions are making demands over self-determination at any point in time, allows me to move beyond the unitary actor assumption. I find that more fragmented SD movements are much more likely to see civil war begin and to be engaged in civil conflict. I conclude by discussing what the analysis tells us about civil war more broadly and suggesting implications for the behavior of states and other types of internally divided actors as well.
Conflict as bargaining failure
Disputes between states and opposition movements revolve around disagreement over some issue or set of issues. The issues under dispute often relates to the structure of governance (such as control of the government or regime type, or the devolution of power to a sub-state level). The specific demands made by opposition movements vary. For example, the Afar in Ethiopia generally seek greater autonomy, while the Arakan in Myanmar generally demand either autonomy or independence, and the Syrian opposition in 2011 seeks, at a minimum, the end of the Assad regime.
In the presence of opposition demands, we can generally assume that states prefer to retain as much political power as possible. As such, these disputes essentially revolve around the question of power-with states preferring to maintain power and oppositions seeking to wrest it from the government entirely or transfer some power to other actors.
When states and opposition movements are unable to manage these disputes short of violence, they face costly, often difficult to resolve, wars. States bear direct costs of fighting by expending resources and incurring casualties. Civil wars also have lasting negative consequences for the state's economy. Additionally, violent conflict typically occurs in the territory occupied by the opposition, leading to loss of life, destruction of infrastructure, and other costs.
In attempts to resolve these disputes, representatives of opposition movements and state governments bargain. This bargaining process can be explicit and formal (carried out through official negotiations) or informal. In many instances, states and opposition movements have successfully negotiated compromises that avoid escalation to militancy. For example, though several factions have resorted to violence in Georgia (including those representing the South Ossetians and Abkhazians) others, such as the Adzhar factions, have successfully avoided conflict though negotiated compromise with the state. 9 Bargaining breaks down when the state is unable or unwilling to satisfy the demands of the opposition.
Bargaining theory explains when and why bargaining failure is likely to happen. 10 This 9 The Adzhar region has gained substantial economic and political autonomy from Georgia.
10 Bargaining approaches are not the only way to understand civil war. Other influential approaches include those focused on grievances (including horizontal inequalities) (Gurr 1970 , Cederman et al 2011 , Østby 2008 , political opportunity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) , and the microfoundations of approach to civil war sees violence as the result of two or more actors failing to resolve their dispute before fighting occurs. 11 We assume that disputes are over some issue space and that actors choose to fight only when they believe they can achieve a better outcome through fighting than through negotiating a compromise deal. Because fighting is costly for both states and oppositions, these disputes can always be resolved if the actors know with perfect information what they could achieve by fighting (which determines the minimum deal they should settle for), if the issues under dispute are divisible, and if the actors can commit credibly to abide by a settlement into the future (Fearon 1995 , Powell 2006 .
In this bargaining framework, each side has an "ideal point," which is its preferred policy.
The point at which either side will fight is set by its relative capabilities and resolve, as well as the costs it will incur by fighting. This outcome, minus the actual costs of fighting, defines the point at which an actor prefers to fight rather than strike a compromise deal (i.e. the actor's "reversion point"). Because fighting is costly for states and oppositions, each should be able to find a compromise acceptable if it is realistic about the outcome of fighting.
The difficulty in reaching an agreement that prevents fighting is that typically neither states nor the opposition know with certainty the capabilities and resolve of their opponent, and both sides have incentives to misrepresent this information to get a better deal though negotiations. Moreover, mobilization (Olson 1971 , Scott 1975 , Peterson 2001 . One of the advantages of the bargaining approach is that it clarifies the conditions under which discontent will manifest into armed conflict, and addresses the ability and willingness of states to accommodate dissidents.
even if both sides find a compromise they can agree to, concerns about credible commitments by the state not to repress the opposition in the future, and by the opposition not to re-launch their challenge later on, can stymie a bargain. 12 Either side may lack credibility because of the time inconsistency problem -that is, what is in the actors' interest today may not be so in the future.
Both sides may want to agree to a settlement that works today, but fear that their opponent will have incentives to challenge them again in the future when the balance of power between them has shifted. Conflict begins when attempts to resolve a disagreement through bargaining fail.
Divisions within the opposition
A key limitation in the application of this bargaining approach for understanding civil war has been the dominance of the assumption that the actors involved are unitary. This assumption may be appropriate when applied to state-to-state bargaining, since we may be able to reasonably assume that states will act as unitary in the actual bargaining process, though divisions in states can create constraints for them (Schelling 1960 , Putnam 1988 Fragmented oppositions, then, include multiple factions operating at the same time and in pursuit of a common goal. What is excluded from this are multiple oppositions seeking different goals, or working on behalf of different people (such as the existence of many nationalist movements in the same state which all seek self-determination for their own population).
The unitary actor assumption is problematic in this context because the number and behavior of factions within opposition movements affects the ability of the opposition and a state to reach agreements that prevent violent conflicts. Opposition movements with more internal divisions create greater information and credibility problems, leading to more frequent bargaining breakdown and violent conflict. In the next section, I discuss how internal divisions affect bargaining.
How divisions affect bargaining between states and opposition movements

Information problems and uncertainty
In existing approaches to bargaining and conflict-where both sides are assumed to be unitary-information problems arise because each side has private information about its own capabilities and resolve and incentives to misrepresent this information (Fearon 1995 what the movement as a whole would settle for at any given time. Because these organizations draw from the same base of support, they compete for supporters and shifts in power among them can alter the movement's reversion point. This creates a considerable challenge for states in assessing what a divided opposition movement will settle for and when it will fight.
All this leads to a great deal of uncertainty over potential settlements for both states and opposition factions. Internally divided oppositions create uncertainty for the state over their reversion points in two ways -unclear capabilities and unclear preferences. This means that bargaining between states and opposition movements can fail not only because they do not know each other's capabilities, but because the state does not know the preferences of the movement with certainty, and the intersection of preferences and capabilities determines the force the opposition can bring to bear on the state. Moreover, the dynamic competition and potential for independent action by opposition factions means that the reversion point can shift quickly.
Credibility problems
The internal characteristics of opposition movements also affect their ability to make Both the capability and legitimacy of a particular faction to exert authority over others is difficult for states to assess. This exacerbates credibility concerns because it is unclear whether any specific faction within the opposition can "deliver" its movement and implement the terms of any agreement made with the state. There are a number of reasons that some opposition factions might resist a particular compromise deal even if it involved substantial concessions. Some opposition factions may have greater influence over politics by resisting settlement than transitioning to a new arrangement. 18 Opposition factions that negotiate a deal with the state can try to persuade or force other factions to comply once it has been made. 19 However, the state and other opposition factions will be uncertain whether they can achieve compliance with a new deal.
Moreover, many opposition movements also lack a clear and uncontested leader in any faction that can make a commitment about the future behavior of all factions in the movement.
Stedman ( In sum, internal divisions in opposition movements affect the two primary mechanisms leading to bargaining failure and, eventually, conflict in the bargaining approach to understanding war. Multiple factions in opposition movements create acute information problems that increase uncertainty about what the movements would settle for and exacerbate commitment problems for opposition factions.
When will we observe civil wars?
While the bargaining process is interactive, influenced by both actors, I focus here on the characteristics of the opposition, holding the state constant. Ceteris parbius, divided oppositions are more likely to cause information and commitment problems, and thus we should expect dyads with fragmented oppositions to have more frequent bargaining breakdown. Abandoning the unitary actor assumption and examining the effect of internal divisions in opposition movements leads to two central predictions about civil war. First, because of the acute information and credibility problems created by internal divisions in these movements, bargaining failure will be more likely, and consequently civil wars will be more likely to begin when movements are more divided.
Hypothesis 1: Opposition movements with more internal divisions are more likely to see the onset of civil war with their host states.
Second, if more opposition factions create credibility and information problems that prevent ex ante settlement, they are likely to prevent bargains during fighting as well. This suggests that not only will civil wars be more likely to begin, but that disputes characterized by fragmented opposition will be more likely to be in civil war at any given point in time than disputes characterized by more coherent oppositions.
Hypothesis 2: Opposition movements with more internal divisions are more likely to be involved in civil war
with their host state.
Evaluating this approach in disputes over self-determination
Are disputes between states and more divided opposition movements more likely to experience civil war? Assessing this requires detailed data on the degree of internal divisions in opposition movements before conflict has broken out. To date, these data have not existed. In fact, it is likely that that these movements have continued to be treated as unitary in quantitative studies of civil war, not because we believe that they are in fact unitary, but because we have lacked the data to address this empirically. opposition movements are self-identifying (i.e. they demand publically some change from their government), we can assume that some degree of political activism would be required for any identification of an opposition movement. Moreover, movements such as the Flemish in Belgium (which has mild grievances compared to many movements in the study) are included, suggesting that poor countries. Both the number of SD movements, and the number of states facing them, has increased steadily over time. 21 Table 1 shows the global distribution of self-determination movements and civil wars onsets over self-determination. An initial look at trends in SD movement structure shows that the assumption that these movements are unitary is empirically wrong the vast majority of the time. Over 90% of the SD movements in the sample are characterized by one or more internal divisions at some point during the dispute. Moreover, over 85% of these SD movements experience changes in the number of To test whether the assumption that opposition movements are always unitary actually limits our understanding of conflict, I examine the effect of this fragmentation of SD movements on civil war. Using these data on internal divisions in SD movements I construct a logged count variable of the number of SD factions active in each year of a dispute because the effect of an additional faction when movements are unitary or slightly divided should not be the same as that of an additional faction in a highly divided movement. The logged SD factions variable ranges from 0 to 3.66, with a mean of 0.87.
Are divided self-determination movements more likely to get into civil war?
If internal divisions in opposition movements create more uncertainty for states and opposition factions, and if divided oppositions have more difficulty making their commitments credible, than a higher number of internal factions in SD movements should be associated with a greater probability of civil war. To evaluate this prediction, I employ multivariate logit models of civil war onset and incidence and cluster the standard errors on the SD movement/state dyad. The unit of analysis is state-SD movement dyad years, covering all years where the SD movement made demands related to self-determination. Civil war onset is coded using the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et. al. 2002) . A civil war onset occurs when at least 25 battle deaths occur in a state-SD movement dyad in a given year and when at least two years of peace have occurred prior to that year. Civil war incidence is every year where the conflict reached 25 battle deaths.
One of the difficulties of this kind of analysis is that the outbreak on civil war is not likely to be independent of previous conflicts in the same state-SD movement dyad. To deal with temporal dependence of recurrent conflict, the data is structured as a binary time-series cross-section, and I include a measure of the number of years since a civil war (onset or incidence) with cubic splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) . 24 Thus, the analysis accounts for the amount of time since the last civil conflict broke out or was active. There are 104 onsets in the sample of 3898 dyad years.
Excluding the years with ongoing civil war in the dyad (655 years), the sample is 3257 dyad years.
25
There are 760 years of civil war in the data set.
In the models presented here, I control for factors likely to influence both the extent of division in the SD movement and the onset of civil war. These include previous concessions to the movement, whether the host state is a democracy, and whether the movement has geographically close kin. Concessions to SD movements suggest that the state is actively attempting to manage the SD movement's demands and may decrease the chance of an armed challenge. In addition, concessions may satisfy some factions' demands and lead them to exit the dispute. Open competition in democratic states and the norm of respecting citizen demands could lead to SD movements having more factions. Additionally, democracies are generally expected to be less likely to experience civil war. 26 Movements with kin in an adjoining state may be more likely to form 24 Using time since civil war in the civil war onset model returns similar finds to those in Table 3 . 25 Excluding years with ongoing civil war in the dyad is appropriate because onset cannot occur in these years (see Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Sambanis 2006) . 26 There are a number of potential reasons that democracies may be less likely to experience civil factions linked to these kin that seek to influence politics in their homeland. Table 3 reports the results of my analyses of civil war onset and civil war incidence.
Table 3 about here
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on the logged SD movement factions variable in model 1 is positive and significant. The more divided SD movements are in a given year, the more likely a civil war onset is. Previous concessions to the movement and the country being a democracy both reduce the chance of civil war, while the existence of kin in a neighboring state increases it.
The substantive effect of divisions in SD movements is large. Moving from the minimum to maximum values of the logged SD factions variable leads to a 23% increase in the probability of civil war onset in a year. This is much larger than the effect of previous concessions or being a democracy (both of which lead to an about two percent decrease in the chance civil war will begin in a given year) or having kin nearby (which leads to a two percent increase in the chance of war).
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The results in model 2 show support for Hypothesis 2-SD movements with more internal divisions are not only more likely to see the onset of civil war, but are more likely to be engaged in civil war in any given year. This suggests that bargaining is more difficult between states and divided SD movements both before and during civil war. Dyads where the country is a democracy are less war. They are less likely to generate high levels of grievance through repression, have large systematic inequalities, and reside in relatively peaceful democratic neighborhoods. Democracies are coded as countries with a Polity 2 score greater than six (Marshall and Jaggers 2000).
likely to see civil war in any given year. The effect of increasing divisions is substantively quite large-moving from the minimum to maximum values on the logged SD factions variable leads to a 37% increase in the likelihood that a SD movement will be in civil war in a given year. The difference in probability of civil war in any given year for democracies verses non-democracies is about a 1.5% decrease. Figure 1 shows a steady increase in the probabilities of civil war onset and incidence as the number of internal factions increases. 29 The majority of disputes that are characterized by internally divided SD movements have two or three internal SD factions. In these dyads, civil war onset is nearly three times as likely as those where the SD movement is cohesive. Likewise, there is a steady increase in the probability that a state and SD movement will be in civil war in any given year as the number of internal factions in the SD movement increases.
Figure 1 about here
These tests support my hypotheses that disputes characterized by more fragmented oppositions are more likely to see the onset of civil war, and are more likely to be in civil war in any given year. I have presented relatively parsimonious models, designed to evaluate the effects on fragmentation of the opposition. In further analysis, I test the robustness of these findings, with particular attention to the potential issue of endogeneity of conflict and fragmentation.
Further analyses
The results presented in Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of a number of additional control variables likely to be associated with the degree to which movements can and are likely to challenge the state militarily. These include measures that capture the relative power of the movement vis-à-vis the state (the movement's relative size and whether it has a territorial base), factors that make insurgency easier for movements (percent of mountainous terrain in the country (logged), whether the country is an oil exporter, and a dummy for political instability), 30 While the analyses in Table 3 provide strong quantitative support for the hypotheses presented here-and these hold up in many robustness tests-there is an important question about potential endogeneity of the fragmentation of the challenging movement and the outbreak of conflict. One of the challenges in studying any kind of conflict process is the endogenous nature of many of the things we are interested in. For example, the possibility of a settlement between a state 30 Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that each of these factors make insurgency easier or more profitable, making civil war onset more likely.
31 Which Gurr (1970) suggests will increase the chance of rebellion.
32 Raleigh and Hegre (2009) show that larger populations attract more conflict.
33 Toft (2003) and Walter (2006) argue that states may fight to stake a reputation, and a greater number of potential future challengers may make conflict more likely.
and opposition movements might engender new opposition factions that would rather fight. If these factions resort to force and can draw the state into conflict, a higher number of opposition factions would appear to be associated with the outbreak of conflict, but the fragmentation of the movement would not lead to bargaining failure the way it has been presented here. Moreover, new SD factions may emerge in the same year that a civil war begins, but in response to the outbreak of conflict rather than preceding it.
To address the potential for endogeneity, I have run a number of alternative specifications of the models in Table 3 . First, I used a one year lagged measure of the number of SD factions to capture the effect of the extent of divisions in the previous year on the likelihood of civil war.
Second, I recoded the number of factions to exclude any SD faction that may have emerged directly in response to concessions made by the state in a year when concessions were made. 34 Third, I
recoded the number of factions to exclude factions that split off of existing factions in the year of a civil war onset. 35 In each case, the size, direction, and significance of the coefficients on the adjusted SD factions variables were similar to the models presented in the preceding section.
In many cases, civil war recurs between the same state and challenger, and this process may also influence the cohesion of an opposition. I ran three additional specifications of the models in Table 3 to assess whether the findings only hold up in disputes with recurrent civil war. The results were robust to including a control for the number of previous civil war onsets, examining only first onsets, and the exclusion of all cases with multiple civil wars. Tables of each of these analyses are presented in the Supplementary Information.
Fragmentation of a SD movement is robustly associated with a higher chance of civil war.
Moreover, including fragmentation in the study of civil war improves our understanding of the outbreak of war. Using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, I can compare the performance of two models of civil war onset, one of which includes factors typically associated with civil war onset, and one that additionally includes my measure of SD movement fragmentation.
An ROC curve shows the ratio of true positive to false positives and can be used to evaluate the performance of different models and we can compare the area under the curve (AUC) of the two models to assess predictive performance (King and Zeng 2001, Weidmann and Ward 2010 ). An AUC of 1 would be perfect prediction. The model with fragmentation reaches an AUC of 0.70, while that without fragmentation has an AUC value of 0.63, suggesting that we gain significant predictive power by using a model that includes the fragmentation of the SD movement.
Conflict and cooperation among opposition factions
In this article, I focus on the number of internal factions in opposition movements, showing that a greater number of factions in self-determination movements increases the chance of civil war between the movement and the state. Yet, the interaction between factions within an opposition movement are also likely to affect information and commitment problems associated with bargaining with the state.
Conflict among opposition factions could both reveal information to states about different factions' preferences and capabilities, but may also exacerbate challenges to making commitments by the opposition credible. Cooperation among factions could help to signal opposition preferences to the state, as well as the likely aggregation of different factions' capabilities should they challenge the state violently. Factional cooperation could also ameliorate opposition commitment problems, but the extent to which cooperation would do either of these things likely depends on the depth and type of cooperation. Some existing studies examine these dynamics in the context of civil wars (Atlas and Licklider 1999, Bapat and Bond 2012, Bond n.d.) , yet this remains an area for further exploration for opposition movements more generally.
Conclusion
While most cross-national studies of relations between states and opposition movements treat these actors as unitary, the internal structure of the opposition clearly matters. This study focuses empirically on self-determination movements as a subset of opposition movements where I can evaluate the effects of opposition fragmentation. I demonstrate that movements with more internal factions are more likely to get involved in civil war and to be in conflict in any given year.
Ignoring internal structure by treating opposition movements as coherent, even unitary, actors severely limits our understanding of when disputes are likely to degenerate into armed conflict.
These empirical findings are important because they shed light on which opposition movements are likely to fight the state and when they are likely to do so. Existing approaches that examine civil war often look at features-such as terrain, the presence of primary commodities, the number of ethnic movements and levels of fractionalization in the state-that largely do not change.
As such, they can only explain differences between cases. But, the internal characteristics of opposition movements change over time. Focusing on this, I have been able to explain outcomes like when fighting is likely to occur in self-determination disputes, rather than just what type of states are more prone to civil war. Understanding which disputes are likely to turn to conflict can help policy-makers target their effort toward conflict prevention. Acknowledging the information and credibility problems associated with divided oppositions can help policy-makers to design mediations to address these challenges more directly.
Abandoning the unitary actor assumption and examining the internal structure of opposition movements creates the opportunity for further analysis that should strengthen our understanding of these actors. In this article, I have measured the number of factions across time and essentially treated all internal factions as equivalent to one another within and across cases. Yet there are likely to be meaningful differences among factions that can increase our understanding of the role they play in conflict processes. For example, some factions are essentially military organizations, while others constitute social pressure movements or political parties. Moreover, some factions are "political wings" or "armed wings" connected to one another to varying degrees. How do the connections between factions, or different types of factions, matter for bargaining with the state?
How does the extent to which factions work together affect their ability to bargaining effectively?
The data that I have here identifying all of these factions, by year, provides an opportunity for further research that examines how characteristics of opposition factions matter.
Although the empirical focus here is on relations between states and SD movements, the theoretical framework centers on relations between actors in a variety of contexts. The unitary actor assumption is not unique to civil war studies, and in fact remains a dominant one in many studies that consider strategic interaction between actors. States, rebel groups, political parties, economic classes, and religious groups have all been treated as unitary-with unified preferences and strategies-in different strategic contexts. Moreover, while this article focuses on the effect of fragmentation on bargaining with the state, opposition fragmentation is also likely to influence or be influenced by other factors that we care about, such as the strategy choices made by dissidents, the horizontal inequality of movements vis-à-vis the state, and potential for mass mobilization to name a few. Greater attention to the structure of non-state actors, including both better data on a larger range of types of opposition, and more exploration of the interaction between internal factions, will advance our understanding of how and when opposition movements challenge states. .4
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